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Abstract
Stories containing counterintuitive concepts are prevalent in a variety of cultural forms including
folktales, TV and radio commercials, and religious parables. Cognitive scientists such as Boyer [2,
3] suggest that this may be because counterintuitive concepts are surprising and more memorable
for people and therefore are more likely to become widespread in a culture. How and why people
remember such concepts has been subject of some debate. This paper presents studies designed
to test predictions of the context-based model of counterintuitive story understanding.
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1 Counterintuitive Stories
Why do some stories become widespread while others die soon after their creation? Memor-
ability has been considered to be an important variable that explains some of the differences
in distribution of cultural concepts. Everything else being equal, stories that are easier
to remember and recall are more likely to be transmitted. Systematic studies of story
memorability started with Bartlett’s classic studies [1]. In a series of experiments, Bartlett
asked British university students to read passages from various folk tales including the
Native North American folk tale “the war of the ghosts” and retell it to others in writing
who then retold it to others. Bartlett analyzed the transformation of various concepts over
successive retellings. He found that culturally unfamiliar concepts such as canoe and ghost
are more difficult to represent in human memory and therefore they are more likely to get
distorted. Kintsch and Greene [7] compared distortions in retellings of an Apache stories
with a Grimm Brothers’ story and found that Grimm Brothers story was better preserved
because it conformed to the structure expected by their subjects.
Recent studies by cognitive scientists of religion directly compare recall rates of intuitive
and counterintuitive concepts to see if there are any differences between different types of
stories. Barrett and Nyhoff [8] repeated Bartlett’s methodology using six Noth American
Native folk tales of about 500 words, containing both intuitive concepts such as the river
and counterintuitive concepts such as a talking bird. They found that recall rates for
counterintuitive concepts were significantly higher than recall rates for intuitive concepts.
Barrett and Nyhoff also designed an artificial story to better control for the number of
intuitive and counterintuitive concepts, narrative structure, and the amount of repeated
exposure to a concept. The futuristic story about a person visiting a museum to see alien
beings and artifacts was designed to contain six concepts of each of the following three types:
1. intuitive (INT) concepts that conform to reader’s expectations about base categories of
given concepts such as a being who is aware of its existence,
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2. minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concepts such as a being who never dies that violate
one intuitive expectation of members of the base category. MCI concepts are contrasted
with maximally counterintuitive (MXCI) concepts such as a being that can read every
one’s mind, never dies and is invisible, and
3. bizarre concepts that do not violate any category expectations but have an unusual feature
value such as a being who weighs 1000 pounds.
They found that after three retellings, counterintuitive concepts were better recalled
than bizarre concepts which were better recalled than intuitive concepts. Boyer and Ramble
[10] used a variant of Barrett and Nyhoff’s alien museum story but did not use a serial
reproduction task. Instead, they had subjects read a story and following a brief distraction
task answer a question requiring reproduction of as many intuitive, counterintuitive and
bizarre items mentioned in the story as the subject could recall. Their results supported
Barrett and Nyhoff’s conclusion that minimally counterintuitive items are best recalled and
the intuitive items are worst recalled. However, none of these studies addressed the question
of whether stories containing minimally counterintuitive ideas are recalled better or not? i.e.,
does the presence of minimally counterintuitive ideas also improve story recall?
Norenzayan et al. [11] conducted experiments to address this questions. They selected
42 Grimm Brothers folktales such that half of the stories were judged to be “culturally
successful” (they attained more hits on 400 world wide web Google searches) and the other
half were considered to be “culturally unsuccessful” (because they had fewer Google hits).
The numbers of counterintuitive ideas present in each story were then counted. They
called stories containing 1 or more counterintuitive idea counterintuitive stories. The results
indicated that a large majority of the folk tales deemed culturally successful had two or three
counterintuitive ideas whereas the number of ideas was more distributed from none to six.
Norenzayan et al. argued that stories that contain two or three counterintuitive ideas enjoy
memorability advantages over stories that have fewer (0 or 1) or more (4, 5, 6, or more)
counterintuitive ideas. Norenzayan et al. did not directly measure the recall rates for stories
containing various numbers of counterintuitive ideas. Upal [12] wrote three short stories
of about 400 words each to directly test Norenzayan et al.’s predictions. Variations of two
of the stories, namely, “The Journey Home” and “The Trader” had been used in previous
experiments. Three versions of each story were created. Version I had one counterintuitive
idea, while the second version had three and the third version had six counterintuitive
concepts in it. Contrary to Norenzayan et al.’s predictions, Version II stories were not found
to be more memorable than Version I and Version III stories. Follow-up studies carried
out using Aesop fables and Aesop-fable-like artificial stories (such as the “Obscurity brings
safety” story presented in the next section) found global cohesion among elements of a story
(especially the counterintuitive concepts) to be a better predictor of story recall [12]. This
makes sense given decades of psychological work on memory for texts [13] [14]. The results
are also in line with findings by Harmon-Vukic & Slone [36] that text-integration overcomes
the memorability advantages of counterintuitive concepts.
1.1 Context Versus Content-based Views
Discourse analysis researchers and psycholinguists have identified global cohesion among the
elements of a text as a key factor in memorability of the text [15]. Cohesion of a piece of
text is defined as connections among various elements of the text and is not just a function
of the text itself but also of the background knowledge that the reader possesses. The
connections that make a text more or less cohesive include coreferences as well as causal and
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logical connections among its various elements. A text is better remembered by a reader
if its constituents can be made coherent by the reader [16]. Furthermore, the more effort
a reader spends in making a text coherent, the more memorable the text for that reader
[17]. Building on this and other work in cognitive science of learning [18, 19] and humor [20],
I hypothesized that counterintuitive ideas contribute to making a story more coherent by
drawing the reader’s attention and by getting them to spend more time on the story trying
to make it coherent [21]. This account suggests that, similar to other expectation-violating
and schema-incongruent concepts [18] and distinctive stimuli [39], counterintuitive ideas
are better remembered because they attract a reader’s attention by violating the reader’s
expectations about what is to come next in the text. When a reader’s expectations are
violated, she attempts to resolve the inconsistency by reasoning to justify the inclusion of
expectation-violating information in the text by invoking her background knowledge. If this
postdiction effort is successful, the expectation-violating concepts become richly linked to the
reader’s existing mental representations. They also become richly connected to the derived
story theme itself. This makes counterintuitive stories (and counterintuitive concepts) more
memorable than intuitve stories and concepts. However, when the postdiction effort fails, the
counterintuitive story and concepts embedded in it are not remembered well. This is what
Vukic, Upal, & Sheehan [36] found when we compared recall rates for MXCI concepts with
those of MCI concepts. We found that despite taking more time to process, MXCI concepts
were not recalled as well as MCI concepts by people.
The postdiction process is a crucial component of the context-based model. It can employ
a reader’s prior world knowledge as well as the knowledge provided to it in the context in
which the concepts are presented. The emphasis on the role of the contextual knowlede has
led to the characterization of this view of the memory for counterintuitive stories as the
context-based view [34, 12]. This view has often been contrasted with that of Barrett [6],
which has been labeled as the content-based view because it de-emphasizes the role played by
the contextual knowledge as it seeks to understand those concepts that are cross-culturally
memorable.
To better understand the context-based model, consider the following story (a version of
which was used in experiments reported in [12]).
Obscurity Brings Safety
Once, a man, who was invisible, ran into a woman who could see invisible objects.
The all-seeing woman said what is a beautiful man like you doing being invisible.
Were you visible, no maiden could refuse you. You are missing out on all the fun. On
hearing this, the invisible man decided to have his body painted with skin color so
that people could see him. On his way home from the paint shop he was mugged and
wished that he had remained invisible as obscurity brings safety.
When readers read the concept of a man, it activates their mental concept of man which
activates related concepts including the concepts of having a physical body which can be seen.
However, upon finding out that the man is invisible, the expectations of such readers are
violated and they engage in the justification process to explain reason(s) for this expectation
violation. The readers may reason that this story belongs to the genre of moral fables1
and use their world knowledge about fables to infer that fables often involve supernatural
1 Readers do frequently (and for the most part successfully) infer genres by reading text even when such
information is not obvious and use this information to reason about the text [23].
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characters which are employed to illustrate a useful truth2. Furthermore, the reader can
justify the man’s invisibility as needed to support the story’s plot. This successful justification
process results in rich encoding for the counterintuitive concept as well as the coherent story
ensuring their easy retrieval in the future. Contrast the above story with the following story
of similar length and title and containing the same number of counterintuitive concepts:
Obscurity Brings Safety
Once a man who had feet instead of hands ran into a woman who was made of iron.
The iron-woman said what is a beautiful man like you doing being difficult? Were
you not difficult, no maiden could refuse you. You are missing out on all the fun. On
hearing this the man with four feet decided to have his body painted with skin color
to become more attractive. On his way home from the paint shop he was mugged and
wished that he had not done that as obscurity brings safety.
In this story, although the reader’s expectation about a person having only two feet is
violated, readers may be unable to construct a justification for this violation even in the
context of a fable since the expectation violation is not helpful for illustrating the story’s
moral lesson. This means that the concept of man-with-four-feet should not be recalled as
well as the concept of invisible-man. This is what was found [12] as people recalled those
concepts whose inclusion could be easily justified more frequently than those concepts which
were harder to postdict in the given context. The context-based model also predicts that:
Determination of unexpectedness and coherability is a function of a broad set of contextual
conditions. The contextual conditions include the background knowledge that the agent
possesses prior to learning the new information [24], the agent’s motivation [25] and the
resources (such as time) available [26] to comprehend the information. Changing, any or
all of these contextual factors can affect a concept’s memorability and different concepts
may be more or less memorable for different people in different situations. This is the
prediction that we attempted to test directly through a number of experiments with
human subjects. Findings to date have generally supported the context-based model
[21, 28, 27, 36].
Activation of a counterintuitive feature should also prompt activation of other counterin-
tuitive features that are strongly associated with it (presumably because counterintuitive
features also tend to co-occur in the agent’s information environment). Thus observation
of one counterintuitive property should prompt an agent to expect more counterintuitive
properties. Thus a statue that speaks English should also be expected to understand
English by a reader in whose semantic memory speaking and understanding are strongly
connected to each other.
Not all INT/MCI/MXCI concepts may be equally well remembered. Some types of INT
concepts may be better remembered than other types of INT concepts (or even some
MCI/MXCI concepts), some MCI concepts may be more memorable than other MCI
concepts, and some MXCI concepts may be more memorable than other MXCI concepts
(or even some INT/MCI concepts).
To be fair, proponent of the content-based view, including Barrett [6], do not claim
that all concepts are unaffected by a changing context, rather that an interesting subset is.
They further argue that such culturally invariant concepts are what cognitive scientists of
2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines fable as, “a fictitious narrative or statement: as a: a legendary
story of supernatural happenings b: a narration intended to enforce a useful truth”
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religion should be interested in. These are the concepts that all people around the world
learn through normal developmental processes. Barrett divides the knowledge that people
learn through these maturationally natural processes [30] into six domains of universality,
spatiality, physicality, biology, animacy, and mentality. He provided a table describing the
six intuitive expectation-sets for the above categories (see Table 1). Barrett argued that each
proposition in the table is supported by developmental psychology studies (page 213: [6]).
Barrett [6] admits a limited role for context when he argues that objects classified into
each of these domains share properties that are so internally coherent that transfer of a
single property from one expectation-set should be considered equivalent to the transfer
of the entire expectation-set. Thus multiple violations involving the same expectation-set
should be considered equivalent to one expectation violation (page 331: [6]). Since, growing,
eating, and being alive are all drawn from the biology expectation-set, the concept of “a
rock that grows, eats and is alive” should be considered to have the counterintuiveness score
of one and thus should be considered minimally counterintuitive argues Barrett. I believe
that this is a step in the right direction, but it does not go all the way in fully appreciating
the role of context. Thus, for instance, according to the context-based view, as multiple
counterintuitive properties from the same domain (e.g., grows, eats, and is alive) are added
to a concept (e.g., rock) the new conceptual combination may indeed be so coherent that
it may actually be perceived by some to be more intuitive than a concept with a single
expectation violation. This paper reports on studies carried out to empirically investigate
people’s intuitive expectations for concepts identified by Barrett as relevant to cognitive
science of religion, and test predictions of the context-based model that all concepts are
impacted by context including those identified by Barrett.
2 Experiment 1
This study was designed to form a baseline of people’s expectations for various concepts of
interest to cognitive scientists of religion. We adopted the techniques used by feature-norming
studies [33, 32, 31] to elicit people’s expectations about features three object categories of
rock, plant, and person. Rocks, plants, and persons are instances of solid objects, living
things, and mental beings respectively. We used lower level concepts as previous research has
found that participants have a hard time generating features for more abstract categories
[31].
2.1 Participants
Participants included 153 adult males and females from across the globe who completed the
online study through Mechanical Turk for a small remuneration. Three participants failed
the attention check question (the question asked participants, “please do not click here”) and
thus were excluded from all subsequent analysis.
2.2 Material & Procedure
The materials consisted of an online form that listed the three concept names with each
concept followed by a text field. Using the instructions developed by McRae et al. [31], we
asked participants to type in as many properties of each of the four concepts as they could
think of in the text-box that followed each concept.
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Table 1 Barrett’s Intuitive Expectation Sets.
Category Properties
Physicality Cohesion (move as connected whole)
Contact (physical contact required for launching or changing direction of
movement)
Continuity (movement is continuous in space)
Solidity (cannot pass through or be passed through by other solid objects)
Tangibility
Visibility
Biology Growth & development
Like begets like
Natural composition
Nourishment needs and processes to satisfy those need
Parts serve the whole to sustain life
Vulnerability to injury & death (if animate, seeks to avoid injury & death)
Kind-specific essence
Animacy Goals
“Self-propelled” (including moving in space,
changing appearance, emitting sounds, etc.)
Mentality Reflective & representational mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires) and standard
relationships among them and limitations of them (e.g., limited perceptual
access)
Self-awareness (including emotions and epistemic states)
Understand language & communication
Universals Consistency (assumptions apply continuously; past was like present, future will
be like present)
Time (and hence, causation) is unidirectional
2.3 Results & Discussion
The participant responses were coded by following a two-step process. The first step involved
creating semantically similar clusters for features produced by participants. Thus the following
participant responses to features for the category rock
“is weighty”, “is heavy”, “weighs a lot”, “has weight”
were all put into one feature labeled “is heavy.” Once the most representative feature
labels had been created, the second step was carried out. This involved assigning a 1 if
the participant was judged to have indicated the feature and assigning a 0 otherwise. Each
category feature was assigned a weight by computing the average coded value. Thus, a
category feature that was indicated by all 150 participants would be assigned a value of 1,
and a feature not mentioned by any participant would be given a zero weight. The category
features were ranked by weight from the most prevalent to the least prevalent.
The results are shown in Figure 1 to Figure 3. They show that a majority of participants
agreed on the feature hard for the category “rock.” A minority of participants in Experiment
1 had also found “is hard” to be the most prevalent feature of the abstract category “solid
object.” Participants also listed additional features’ e.g., “has minerals,” “is round/smooth,”
“used to build things,” “gray” in the case of rocks, “absorbs sunlight,” “needs water,” and
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Figure 1 Most commonly mentioned features of the category rock along with the proportion of
participants who mentioned it (indicated as a weight for a node).
Figure 2 Most commonly mentioned features of the category plant.
“absorbs soil nutrients” in the case of plants, and “has hands/feet,” “has eyes/ears,” “has
heart/blood” in the case of “person” that are not salient features of their superordinate
categories. Almost half the participants also agreed that “a plant” grows.
The features that our participants generated for the category plant were similar to
Ashcraft [33] who used a different question and only gave participants 40 seconds per word
to write down properties. Ashcraft only listed top 5 features which included green, leaves,
flower, grows, and stem.
3 Experiment 2
This study was designed to investigate changes in people’s category expectations upon hearing
of a counterintuitive feature along with one of the categories from Experiment 1.
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Figure 3 Most commonly mentioned features of the category person.
3.1 Participants
Participants included 153 adult males and females from across the globe who completed the
online study through Mechanical Turk for a small remuneration. Three participants failed
the attention check question (the question asked participants, “please do not click here”) and
thus were excluded from all subsequent analysis.
3.2 Materials and Procedures
The materials consisted of an online form that provided participants a category name
and a counterintuitive feature and asked to list any other properties and features of the
counterintuitive object they could think of. The following properties derived from Barrett’s
[6] animacy and mentality domains were included for both rock and plant because they were
thought to be counterintuitive for both categories.
eats food
can see
can talk
can hear others
sings
has strong beliefs
can understand
others
has emotions
is self-aware
In addition, the following three biology properties were included for only the category
rock.
grows produces offspring can move by itself
Since both animacy and mentality properties are intuitively expected of persons, we
included the following six counterintuitive properties for that category.
can walk thru walls
can see thru walls
can hear from miles away
can fly
can leap over skyscrapers
is invisible
3.3 Results & Discussion
The participant responses were coded by following a two-step process followed in Experiment
1. The top ten feature participants most commonly listed for various counterintuitive concepts
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involving the concept of rock are shown in Table 2. When we compare it to the features
most commonly mentioned when presented with the concept of rock alone without any
counterintuitive features (Figure 1), we find that people’s expectations have significantly
changed.
Looking down Column 1 of Table 2 shows that the feature most strongly associated with
the category “rock” (namely, “is hard”) by a whopping 85% of our participants is now the 6th
most frequently mentioned feature with only about 1 in 20 participants who saw “rock that
grows” mentioning it. The second most frequently mentioned feature of the category “rock”
namely, “is solid” (listed by almost half of the participants who saw only the base category
name) is now only mentioned by 1 in 12 participants who saw category rock combined with
the property grows. Looking across top rows of Table 2 shows the powerful effect of context
as “thinks” is the most frequently listed feature of rock concepts combined with various
counterintuitive properties while it was not mentioned by any of the participants who saw
base category name alone (as shown in Figure 1). According to the context-based view, this
happens because activation of a counterintuitive property (e.g., hears) results in activation
of features that are most strongly associated with it (talks, thinks, hears, and has ears). The
top ten features participants most commonly listed for various counterintuitive concepts
involving the category “plant” are shown in Table 3. It shows a significant shift in people’s
expectations as a result of hearing a single counterintuitive property being associated with
the category plant.
The remarkable similarity between features generated by participants for the seemingly
unrelated base categories of rock and plant (shown in columns of Table 2 & Table 3) shows
the impact that activation of counterintuitive properties has on people’s expectations. Thus
the top two features of “rock that can hear” and “plant that can hear” are “talks” and
“thinks” and are listed by almost the same percentage of participants across both categories.
Similarly, the properties of “listens,” “has ears,” “has emotions,” “is self-aware” and “is
alive” were listed by similar proportions of our participants regardless of the base concept.
There are also a few notable differences between Tables 2 and 3. These differences illustrate
the impact of the two base category labels and the interaction between the category labels
and the counterintuitive properties. Thus while the feature “grows” is only mentioned
by participants who saw the property “eats food” added onto the category rock, it was
mentioned by participants who saw any counterintuitive property added onto the category
label “plant” (even though it does not show up among the top 10 features for “plant that has
emotions” it was mentioned by 1% of the participants). This is because “grows” is the most
frequently listed feature of the category plant (Figure 2) but not of the category rock (Figure
1). Thus when a feature is strongly connected to both the base category (e.g., plant) and the
counterintuitive property (e.g., eats), it is strongly activated by the conceptual combination
of the category label and the counterintuitive property (e.g., 44% participants listed it for
“plant that eats”). When the feature is only connected to one of the two, however, it is only
weakly activated. Thus “grows” is only mentioned by 19% of the participants in response to
the combination “plant that can see” and “plant that is self-aware.” Similarly, it is listed by
20% of the participants in response to the combination “rock that eats food.”
The top ten feature participants most commonly listed for various counterintuitive
concepts involving the concept of persons are shown in Table 4. Similar to the results for
rock and plant concepts combined with counterintuitive properties, people’s expectations
for person concepts have significantly shifted as “is strong” becomes the most frequently
mentioned feature even though it wasn’t mentioned for the category person by any of
our participants. The results support the context-based view that people’s expectations
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Table 2 The 10 most commonly listed features of the various counterintuitive conceptual
combinations involving the rock concept. The percentage of participants who mentioned each feature
is indicated in parenthesis.
Rock that
grows produces
offspring
can move
by itself
eats food can see can talk
gets bigger
(14)
eats (22) roll (19) grows (20) thinks (14) thinks (22)
moves (14) mates (18) is solid
(15)
digests (17) moves/acts
(12)
communicates
(19)
eats (10) moves/walks
(16)
eats (10) poops (16) is fictional
(12)
hears (14)
is solid (8) is alive (13) can walk
or run (8)
drinks (12) is solid (11) moves (11)
is round (6) is solid (10) reproduces
(7)
is alive (12) eats (8) has emotions
(10)
is hard (5) is human (6) is alive (7) has a
mouth (10)
is hard (7) is fictional (8)
is fictional (5) has emotions
(5)
is hard (5) gets hungry
(9)
is round (6) is solid (7)
is alive (5) is fictional (3) is round
(5)
can die (8) is rough or
edgy (6)
eats (5)
can reproduce
(3)
is round (3) has emo-
tions (4)
can repro-
duce (8)
has emotions
(5)
has a mind (5)
can die (3) is hard (1) has wants
or desires
(4)
breathes
(8)
is self-aware
(5)
I alive (5)
Rock that
can hear
others
sings has
strong
beliefs
can un-
derstand
others
has
emotions
is self-aware
talks (22) talks (30) thinks (23) thinks (33) thinks (21) thinks (34)
thinks (19) thinks (13) has emo-
tions (15)
talks (20) can be happy
(12)
has emotions
(26)
listens (14) moves/acts
(11)
has a mind
(11)
has emo-
tions (18)
can laugh
(10)
is alive (14)
has ears (13) makes music
(9)
is strong
willed (9)
can hear
(17)
can be sad
(10)
talks (8)
is solid (12) is solid (9) hears (7) is solid (13) talks (10) eats (7)
has emotions
(10)
is fictional (9) talks (6) empathizes
(9)
can love (8) hears (7)
understands
(7)
has emotions
(7)
is fictional
(6)
has a mind
(7)
is alive (8) has a mind (6)
is hard (7) has a mouth
(6)
is alive (5) is alive (5) can hear (8) is aware of sur-
roundings (6)
is self-aware
(6)
can hear (6) is self-
aware (5)
moves/acts
(5)
is self-aware
(8)
sees (5)
is alive (6) is hard (5) is human
(5)
is hard (5) has a mind
(5)
is hard(5)
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Table 3 The 10 most commonly mentioned features of various counterintuitive plant concepts.
Plant that
can see can eat has emotions can talk that sings
grows (19) grows (44) thinks (22) thinks (25) talks (23)
eats (15) drinks (14) can cry (16) can hear (17) grows (20)
moves (15) can digest (12) can eat (13) grows (13) eats (14)
has eyes (13) has roots (11) can be happy
(12)
has emotions
(11)
is fictional (7)
thinks (13) reproduces (10) is alive (8) can eat (11) thinks (7)
has emotions (9) has leaves (9) is self-aware (8) is alive (8) breathes (7)
is self-awae (7) can die (8) can love (7) has a mind (6) has emotions (6)
is fictional (7) poops (7) has leaves (7) breathes (6) has roots (6)
reproduces (6) talks (7) can laugh (7) is fictional (5) can hear (5)
can hear (6) has fruit (5) can be sad (7) has roots (5) can dance (5)
Plant that
can hear has strong beliefs can understand is self-aware
can talk (23) thinks (28) talks (22) thinks (25)
thinks (19) grows (20) thinks (19) grows (19)
grows (16) has emotions (15) grows (19) eats (18)
listens (13) has roots (10) has emotions (17) has emotions (15)
has ears (11) is self-aware (8) can hear (14) is self-aware (11)
can eat (11) can eat (7) is self-aware (7) is alive (8)
has emotions (11) has leaves (7) is alive (6) reproduces (7)
can see (7) is alive (7) empathizes with others (5) has a mind (6)
is self-aware (6) can talk (7) has leaves (5) is fictional (5)
is alive (5) has a mind (6) is green (5) has leaves (5)
change as they find out about counterintuitive properties of an object. This is because
counterintuitive properties activate concepts that are strongly connected to them in an
agent’s semantic memory. A “domain” in the context-based view thus is a set of propositions
that are strongly connected in the agent’s semantic memory and may or may not perfectly
correspond to Barret’s Table 1. Findings of our experiments hint at the strength of some
of these connections. For instance, we can conclude that grows is strongly connected to
eats because (1) our participants listed grows as a feature of the conceptual combination
“rock that eats” whereas they had not included it as a feature of the category of rock alone,
(2) the proportion of participants who listed grows as a property of “plant that grows” is
larger than the proportion of participants that listed “grows” as a property of the category
plant, and (3) our participant listed eats as a feature of the conceptual combination “rock
that grows” whereas they had not included it as a feature of the category rock. Thus if
a conceptual combination of a concept C with a property p causes a larger proportion of
participants to include a feature f (than the proportion that had listed f as a feature of C
alone), we consider it as an indication that p and f are strongly connected to each other in
our participants semantic memories. Using this principle allows us to infer the two domains
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
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Table 4 The 10 most commonly listed properties of counterintuitive persons.
The Person Who
can walk thru
walls
can see thru
walls
can hear from
miles away
can leap over
skyscrapers
can fly is invisible
is strong (27) is strong (19) can talk (16 is strong (35) superhero (19) thinks (13)
is a superhero
(18)
is a super-
hero (19)
thinks (14) is a superhero
(29)
can move (15) rescues
people (13)
has a mind
(13)
thinks (15) can fly (12) can fly (16) is a pilot (14) is a super-
hero (12)
thinks (13) can fly (14) is a superhero
(11)
can move
(13)
can eat (13) is undetec-
ted (11)
can fly (12) can move
(14)
rescues
people (10)
has hand-
s/feet (11)
has a mind
911)
is strong (11)
is a ghost
(11)
rescues
people (9)
is strong (9) can eat (11) thinks (9) commits
crimes (9)
eats (9) is fictional
(8)
has ears (9) can see thru
walls (9)
is strong (8) is lonely (9)
has super-
powers (9)
can talk (7) can eat (9) has a mind
(7)
rescues people
(8)
can fly (9)
can see thru
walls (7)
can eat (7) can learn
secrets (7)
thinks (6) can talk (7) can walk
thru walls
(9)
can move (7) has eyes (7) has emotions
(7)
rescues
people (7)
is fictional (7) can spy/hear
secrets (8)
4 Experiment 3
The context-based view also suggests that as multiple counterintuitive properties from the
same domain (e.g., grows, eats, and is alive) are added to a concept (e.g., rock) the new
conceptual combination may indeed be so coherent that it may actually be less expectation
violating than a concept with a single expectation violation. This study was designed to test
this prediction. We created four high level categories of solid objects, living things, animals,
and mental beings to correspond to Barrett’s domains of physicality, biology, animacy, and
mentality [6]. We selected the properties listed in Table 5 from expectation sets associated
with these categories.
Each of the category labels was paired with one and two properties from a domain to
create four types of statements:
1. CE: Category label + one intuitive ex-
pectation.
2. CEE: Category label + two intuitive ex-
pectations
3. CC: Category label + one counterintuit-
ive expectation
4. CCC: Category label + two counterintu-
itive properties
The intuitive statements (CE & CEE) were created by pairing category labels with
expectations from the category’s associated expectation-set. Thus “all solid objects move as
connected wholes” was one of the two CE statements created for the category solid objects.
“Imagine ‘a solid object that moves as a connected whole,’ how likely is it that it also needs
force to be moved?” was the only CEE statement created for the category of solid objects.
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Figure 4 Context-based view of the biology domain.
As shown in Figure 6, the expectation sets can be organized hierarchically with phys-
icality or solid objects on top and mentality or mental beings on the bottom such that
objects belonging to lower categories inherit the properties of upper level expectation sets.
Counterintuitive statements (CC & CCC) were created in two ways. For the categories
of solid objects, living things, and animals, counterintuitive statements were designed by
pairing an upper level concept (e.g., solid object) with a lower level property (e.g., grows).
To create CC and CCC statements for the category of mental beings, we used the following
six superhuman properties:
1. is invisible,
2. can fly through the air,
3. can see through walls,
4. can walk through walls,
5. can hear whispers from
miles away, and
6. can leap over skyscrapers
4.1 Participants
Participants included 153 adult males and females from around the world who completed the
online study through Mechanical Turk for a small remuneration. Three participants failed
the attention check question (the question asked participants, “please do not click here”) and
thus were excluded from all subsequent analysis.
4.2 Materials and Procedures
The materials consisted of an online form that asked study participants to indicate their
level of agreement/disagreement (on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “3: Strongly agree”
to “−3: Strongly disagree”) with each of the 297 statements (13 CE, 10 CC, 65 CEE, and
209 CCC statements) constructed using the procedure described above.
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Figure 5 Context-based view of the mentality domain.
Figure 6 Expectation set hierarchy.
Table 5 Properties selected from expectation sets.
Solid objects Living things Animals Mental Beings
1. move as connec-
ted wholes
2. physical contact
is required for
launching or chan-
ging the direction
of movement
1. grow and develop
over time
2. produce offspring
that are similar to
them
3. are composed
of natural sub-
stances
4. have processes to
satisfy their nour-
ishment needs
1. take actions to
satisfy their goals
2. are self-propelled
1. see through eyes
2. have self-
awareness
3. have emotions
4. understand oth-
ers
5. can talk to others
6. can hear others
7. have strong be-
liefs
8. can sing songs
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Table 6 Mean participant agreement scores (& standard deviations) for various statement types.
Type Solid Objects Living Things Animals Mental beings Total
CEE 1.66 (1.90) 2.47 (1.09) 2.40 (1.07) 2.18 (1.19) 2.20 (1.21)
CE 0.78 (2.05) 1.87 (1.33) 1.16 (1.65) 1.36 (1.70) 1.26 (1.71)
CCC −0.08 (2.11) 0.06 (2.15) 0.37 (2.17) 0.32 (1.84) 0.05 (2.10)
CC −2.41 (1.20) −0.46 (2.03) 0.47 (1.86) −2.80 (0.75) −1.82 (1.93)
4.3 Results & Discussion
Table 6 shows the mean participant agreement scores for solid objects, living things, animals,
and mental beings. The overall results show that our participants rated the intuitive
statements involving two intuitive expectations as least surprising and counterintuitive
statements with one expectation-violation were rated as most surprising. As predicted by
the context-based model, participants rated statements involving two violations from the
same expectation-set as significantly less surprising than statements with a single expectation
violation (F=1.18, p < 0.05). This pattern was also observed for solid objects (F=3.06,
p < 0.05), living things (F=1.12, p < 0.05), and mental beings (F=6.03, p < 0.05). The
results for animals, however, did not follow this pattern with CCC ideas being rated as more
surprising than CC ideas, although the differences did not reach the level of significance
(F=1.36, p=0.31).
The results of our study clearly show that people’s perceptions of unexpectedness do
vary continuously. We also did not find a sharp boundary between INT and MCI concepts
as some intuitive ideas were rated as less expected than some counterintuitive ideas. The
following intuitive concepts were rated by our participants to be more surprising than the
counterintuitive concepts given below (mean expectedness ratings are shown in parenthesis
besides each statement).
More Surprising Intuitive State-
ments
1. Mental being that understands others
can also talk to others (mean expected-
ness: 0.73)
2. Physical contact is required for launch-
ing or changing the direction of move-
ment of all solid objects (0.73)
3. Solid objects move as connected wholes
(0.73)
4. Animals are self-propelled (0.97)
5. Solid objects that requires physical con-
tact for launching move as connected
wholes (1.09)
Less Surprising Counterintuitive
Statements
1. Animal that can talk can also under-
stand English (2.11)
2. A solid object that has processes to
satisfy its nourishment needs is also
composed of natural substances (1.83)
3. A solid object that produces offspring
that are similar to it also grows (1.83)
4. An animal that has strong beliefs also
has self-awareness (1.74).
5. An animal that talks also has self-
awareness (1.50)
There were also differences in participant’s expectedness rating for different domains
(shown in Tables 3-6). Two-property intuitive statements (CEE) involving living things were
rated by participants as more expected than two-property intuitive statements involving
the other three domains. On the other hand, counterintuitive statements with one-property
(CC) involving mental beings were rated as more surprising than counterintuitive statements
involving the domains of animals, living things, and solid objects.
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For each of the domains we can also compare ratings for intuitive and counterintuitive
statements derived using properties taken from various expectation sets. Considering the
domain with the largest number of statements, namely, that of solid objects. We can compare
counterintuitive statements involving properties taken from expectation sets of living things,
animals, and mental beings. The results show that counterintuitive statements created
by pairing solid objects with properties taken from the living things expectation sets are
perceived to be the least surprising followed by concepts created by pairing solid objects with
animal expectations. The counterintuitive statements involving properties taken from mental
beings domain are rated as most surprising. These results mirror the domain hierarchy shown
in Figure 6. The closer the expectation to solid objects in the expectation set hierarchy, the
less surprising people found the concepts created by pairing the concept with expectation sets
derived from those domains. These differences in expectation scores involving expectation
derived from different domains can be made sense of by appealing to the context-based as
well as the content-based view. The context-based view, however, also predicts that there
may also be differences in people’s expectations for various properties that have been placed
by Barrett [6] in the same expectation-set. We find several notable differences in expectedness
rating provided by our participants. Consider the expectation set of living things, we found
that the statements involving “produce offspring that are similar to them” to be rated by our
participants as significantly more surprising than the statement involving about “consists of
natural substances.” This was true for whether the statements were paired with the concept
of “living things” or “solid objects.” Similarly for the “mental beings” expectation-set, we
found that statements involving the property of “see through its eyes” to be rated as less
surprising than “can talk to others.” This was true regardless of the concept these properties
were paired with.
We also found some property pairings to be rated more intuitive by our participants
than other property pairings. For instance, being able to see was not considered by our
participants to be relevant to singing. Similarly, while talking, hearing, and understanding
(and singing, believing, and having self-awareness to a lesser degree) seemed to go together
in our participant’s minds, as statements involving talking, hearing, and understanding (such
as “a rock that talks to others can also understand others”) were rated significantly more
intuitive than statements about seeing and singing (e.g., “a rock that can see through its
eyes can also sing”) or seeing and talking/listening/understanding. In fact the statements
about “solid objects” talking and listening, talking and understanding, and talking and being
self-aware were rated as less surprising than intuitive statements that paired solid objects
with expectations from the solid-object-expectation-set. This supports the prediction of the
context-based model that certain multiple violations from the same intuitive expectation set
may be perceived by people to be less surprising than single expectation violations.
The results of this study also shed some light on a yet mostly unexplored aspect of the
context-based model, namely, the postdiction process of how people make sense of the surpris-
ing information. Upal [5, 12] argued that through cumulative effects of repeated postdiction
(especially when such sense-making is culturally sanctioned) an initially counterintuitive
concept may over time become intuitive for some individuals. Our results show that multiple
expectation violations involving properties that are strongly connected in an agent’s semantic
memory (presumably because they frequently co-occur in an agent’s information environment
or because there are causal theories that links them together), make it easier for that agent
to justify expectation violations and make the new concept coherent. Thus since talking,
listening, and understanding are strongly connected in our participant’s minds, mention of
any one of these concepts strongly activates the other two unmentioned concepts. Thus
CMN’14
238 A Cognitive Framework for Understanding Counterintuitive Stories
upon hearing of a solid object that talks, our participants expect that solid object to also be
able to talk and understand. This explains why co-occurrence of these properties is rated
by our participants to be significantly more intuitive than co-occurrence of properties that
are unrelated in our participant’s minds (even though they are placed in the same intuitive
expectation set by Barrett).
While the results of our study do indicate a need to revisit the particular contents of
intuitive expectation sets as laid out by Barrett [6], they also illustrate the futility of the
whole notion of creating fixed sets of cognitive universal intuitive expectation sets that
exhaustively encode all expectations that all people have at all times! The context-based
model avoids these ad-hoc boundaries by arguing that people’s expectations for various
concepts vary continuously and that memory for various concepts is a function of (a) how
surprising people find a concept, and (b) people’s ability to make sense of the concept once
they have seen them.
5 Conclusion
The finding that counterintuitve concepts embedded in stories are more memorable than
other types of concepts has been important for cognition and culture in general and cognitive
science of religion in particular. Barrett [6] attempted to devise a coding scheme to allow
clear identification of intuitive and counterintuitive concepts by hypothesizing six intuitive
expectation domains. The studies reported here are the first empirical attempt to elicit
people’s intuitive knowledge about various common categories. Our results suggest a
refinement of Barrett’s of mentality and biology domains that should help cognitive scientists
of religion and others make more precise predictions about memory for counterintuitive
concepts. We also found that people find concepts that include multiple violations of closely
associated features (such as talking and listening in case of “a rock that talks and listens”)
to be less surprising than concepts that violate only one of these expectations (such as a
rock that talks).
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